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Abstract 
This paper is devoted to the study of autistic speech from the perspective of iconicity. 
Language is a major means of human I-not-I interaction and communication. When there 
is affinity between content and the form designating it, this form (linguistic units and 
their organization) is said to be iconic to that content. Looking at the various modes of 
linguistic iconicity (from the phonetic level to the entire discourse, and from identity and 
continuity to modes of resemblance and analogy), milestone autistic denominators are 
detailed and analyzed as they occur in an authentic diary written over three years by a 
woman with autism. This article offers a look at echolalia; pronoun management; 
perception of affinity as exemplified in the use of kinship terms; content words vs. 
grammar markers, neologisms and other phenomena.  These findings are then integrated 
to show that mutism is the most authentic – and iconic – mode enacting the traumatic 
autistic rupture of the delusory symbiotic state. In this premature frail encapsulation the 
counter-iconic use of language is in itself a pseudo use. By treating both language 
(phones, words, idioms, discourse, etc.) and people as things, the verbal oddities of 
autistic speakers authentically iconize the inauthentic inanimate stance. 
 
 
In memory of Hadar,  
my autistic triplet twin 
– with love. 
 
 
Introduction 
Iconicity is a quality of affinity between content and the form designating it. Semiotics, 
following Charles Peirce (1965) classifies signs into three cardinal categories: firstness: 
identity (pure icon); secondness: resemblance (index) and thirdness: analogy mediated by 
convention (symbol). Linguistic iconicity may manifest itself along the different 
linguistic levels: from the single phone to the entire discursive interaction.  
 
Mankind has long used signs to communicate. Visual signs have existed from prehistoric 
periods of human development. The color red depicting the very content of danger: blood 
and fire, is a visual sign currently used all over the world to warn or prohibit. 
Philosophers and linguists disagree about the iconic quality of words. In his dialogue 
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“Cratylus” Plato presented two opposing approaches: one claiming that the relations 
between the signifiers (phonetic strings) and the content they denote are arbitrary and 
conventionally determined (in every language and in each era); the other arguing for a 
necessary, and hence natural, intrinsic affinity between the content and the particular 
signifier denoting it. Onomatopoeia – mimicking the sound produced by an object in the 
real world by using the sound system (phonemes) of a language (signifiers) to denote that 
referent (such as “cock” or “bottle”) – employs phonetic acoustic iconicity (image). A 
different kind of iconicity (diagram) operates with resemblance of characteristic features 
or qualities, such as the parallel between the syntactic ordering of words and of 
constituents in a sentence and the temporal or thematic sequence of the events in reality 
described by those words or sentences.   
 
Following Frances Tustin (1992, p. 9), the term ‘autism’ covers “a specific spectrum of 
disorders in which there is an absence of human relationships and gross impoverishment 
of mental and emotional life”. These impairments, she argues, result from “the blocking 
of awareness by an early aberrant development of autistic procedures”. Lacking clear 
neurobiological markers autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) are necessarily described in 
behavioral terms (Lord & Spence, 2006, p. 2; DSM-V, 2013, pp. 50-59). Language – 
present or absent – plays a central role in the behavior, diagnosis and assessment, as well 
as in the treatment of individuals with ASD.2   
 
Considering the various modes of linguistic iconicity (from the phonetic level to the 
entire discourse, and from identity to different modes of resemblance and analogy: 
secondness and thirdness) the emergence of autistic etiology in autistic speech is outlined. 
This article offers a detailed look at different types of echolalia; pronoun management 
(especially regarding I-not-I); perception of affinity as exemplified in the use of kinship 
terms, and content words vs. grammar markers reflecting soft vs. hard.         
 
                                                2  Kasher  and  Meilijson’s  deliberate  decision  to  restrict  their  paper  “Autism  and Pragmatics of Language” (1996) to the reduction of the autistic core impairments to terms  of  the  knowledge  required  for  the  various  pragmatic  categories  as  they surface in the utterances produced by autistic speakers, irrespective of the autistic etiology, results  in a  seemingly  correspondence between  their description and  the autistic  denominators  listed  in  the DSM‐V. Nevertheless,  the  objective  of  the DSM being a diagnostic tool is to establish the set of externally perceived symptoms, and so  it  is  not  expected  to  engage  in  issues  such  as  etiology  and  causes;  Kasher  and Meilijson’s decision seems unjust. Due to space limit, we are unable to refer to their specific arguments. We suffice here expressing our hope that the current discussion, integrating  psychoanalytic  conceptualization  with  linguistic  tools  will  make apparent  the  necessity  to  tie  linguistic  observations  concerning  autistic  linguistic behaviour  with  clinical  conceptualization.  Doing  so  shows  that  what  surfaces  as pragmatic oddities,  are not,  as Kasher and Meilijson argue mental representations shortcomings  and  matters  to  do  with  knowledge  and  skills,  but  the  iconic manifestations of the autistic separation‐individuation state and trauma. Pragmatics viewed, following Kasher and Meilijson, “as the linguistic conditions of appropriate use of sentences in context”, these oddities seen from the autistic ruptured context turn out to be not only the most appropriate but iconically imaging that state. 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Methodology 
Data 
The empirical data for the study comes from an authentic handwritten diary and a few 
letters written between 1991 and 1998 by Hadar Ephratt, supported by my intimate and 
firm familiarity with her oral style. Hadar (1956-1998), after on- going withdrawal since 
the age of two, was finally diagnosed with autism at the age of six.3 She lived her entire 
adult life in a hostel (Beit-Ganim residence for independent adults with autism in 
Jerusalem) and worked at Meital (sheltered occupational center for persons with autism). 
Hadar turned to the diary – notebooks as well as occasional loose sheets of paper – at 
work and at home, particularly in the last three years of her life when she was coping 
with breast cancer. The diary consists of hundreds of pages covered in a childishly large 
handwriting (see below Illustration 1), the graphemes do not accord with the conventional 
spelling of the words: rather both spelling and spacing follow the sound of speech. The 
material is authentic: not only isn’t it edited (by Hadar or others)4 but also, her diary 
style, lacking register competence5 – in flow, grammar and wording – is identical to her 
oral (spoken) style (see note 16 below concerning the letters). There are no punctuation 
marks throughout, except for a full stop at the conclusion of each entry – narrative chunk 
– stating “zehu”. (that’s it.).6  
 
Qualitative Analysis 
Mapping excerpts of autistic speech onto iconic qualities of the autistic etiology, involves 
three facets: language, iconicity and autism. The next section (pp. 7-24) presents and 
locally analyses the findings from the data, classified according to the degree of iconicity 
between the specific documented autistic speech (text) and the micro autistic signifiers 
and states (outlined, e.g., in DSM-V, 2013, pp. 50-59). After that (see pp. 24-27) we 
synthesize the above groupings and analysis into an integrated picture of the autistic 
etiology as studied and described in the literature. 
 
 
                                                3   Hadassa Lascar Institute in  Jerusalem. Though autism was described (by Kanner back in 1943 and by Asperger in 1944, it entered the DSM only in 1980 (DSM‐III). In 1962 the assessment of autism was quite new among Israeli professionals (see e.g., Davidovitch  et  al.,  2013),  hindering  diagnosis  especially  in  cases  such  as  Hadar’s, whose autism was veiled by substantial vocabulary and high cognitive capabilities (see Kanner, 1943 and Asperger, 1944).   4 Editing  is  a  serious obstacle when attempting  to utilize published diaries  for  the study of the language of autistic persons (see e.g., Sellin Birger, 1993 [1994]).      5  Register  competence  is  the  ability  to  select  between  various  styles  (lexicon  and grammar)  according  to  the  purpose  of  communication  (diary,  letter,  the  intimacy between the interlocutors (formal, informal) and the medium (such as written, oral, face‐to‐face  or  mediated).  This  lack  of  register  competence  might  be  a  case secondary  to  the  autistic  state,  e.g.,  resulting  from  matters  to  do  with  tuition, knowledge and learned skills. Not directly originating from the autistic state this too fails to count as support for Kasher and Meilijson’s (1996) arguments – see note 2 above.         6 For notation and translation, see note 9 below.  
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Analysis of the Linguistic Iconicity of Autistic Speech  
One of the milestone denominators of autistic objects is their odd use, a use unlike their 
common or original function (Kanner, 1973, p. 246; Asperger, 1944, p. 81; Tustin, 1992, 
p. 5; Amir, 2014, p. 70, see excerpt [14] below, and the quote from Bosch (1970, p. 93) 
following excerpt [21]). It is, then, not surprising that autistic speech too shows similar 
peculiarities. Language as a mode of interaction necessitates three elements: two 
interactants and a need. This is how Amir opens her book Cleft Tongue: The Language of 
Psychic Structures:  
 
 
Language is first and foremost a depressive achievement involving both the 
concession of what cannot be articulated – and the giving up of the symbiosis with the 
other by acknowledging him or her as a distinct subject. Indeed, acknowledging 
separation is simultaneously the driving motivation to speak as well as an essential 
condition for establishing language (2014, p. 1, see also Tustin, 1992, pp. 78-80). 
 
The infant, then acquires and integrates language while it becomes differentiated as a 
separate self. This separation, which takes place at the formative age between 2 and 3 
(referred to as “the Oedipus complex” or by “the introduction to the parental order”), 
makes absences apparent, thus motivating the call to the other (see Amir, 2014, pp. 1-30; 
Bosch, 1970, pp. 85-87).  
 
Autistic Muteness as Pure Icon 
Autism – when the route of I-not-I differentiation is prematurely cut – surpluses language 
altogether. Individuals with autism, who do not speak, iconically, reflect as such the 
autistic state of being. This iconic mode of reflection lacks the necessary two-fold quality 
of a sign: separate and independent content (referent, the ‘what’) and form (signifier, 
‘how’). In the absence of separation between form (psychic mutism)7 and content 
(confused immature separation, and with no integrated self, which is thus cut-off from the 
experience of absence and needs) autistic mutism does not signify the autistic state but is 
the autistic state per se. Peirce’s pure iconicity (firstness), being undifferentiated (such as 
the a feeling), does not constitute a sign (1965, 2.92; 2.276; 3.1). Autistic mutism is not a 
form the person with autism uses to communicate her state (by way of the content) – it is 
one and the same with that state.  
 
Autistic Speech as Iconic Imaging of the Autistic State 
Since it is a systematic convention of signification, language falls outside Peirce’s pure 
icon (firstness). When iconic, language signs can only result in iconic signs of secondness 
                                                7 As DSM‐V (2013, p. 51 E) and scholars point out organic or cognitive impairments must first be ruled out. 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and thirdness.8 The muteness of the person with autism is not only a symptom, which 
belongs according to Peirce in the category of indices, i.e., “a sign which signifies its 
object solely by virtue of being really connected with it” (1965, Book 3, p. 211, Book 2, 
p. 179) but a pure icon of the autistic state of being, while autistic speech – the object of 
our investigation – is counter-iconic. Kanner (1943, p. 243) argues that as far as the 
communicative functions of speech are concerned, there is no fundamental difference 
between a speaking person with autism and a mute person. We now investigate the 
semiotic relations holding between the autistic states and the selected typical linguistic 
behaviors emerging in autistic speech: our first sub-section focuses on echolalia (pp. 8-
10); we then focus on similarity (pp. 10-20) and conclude looking at analogy (pp. 20-24).  
 
The iconic qualities of echolalia 
Among “[r]estricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities” the DSM-V 
(2013, p. 50) specifies as DSM denominators “[s]tereotyped or repetitive […] use of 
objects, or speech (e.g., simple motor stereotypies, lining up toys or flipping objects, 
echolalia, idiosyncratic phrases)” as well as “[i]nsistence on sameness, inflexible 
adherence to routines, or ritualized patterns of verbal or nonverbal behavior”.  
 
In essence, echolalia – immediate or delayed echoing of speech (others’ or one’s own 
words or phrases) – conceptually covers all the verbal behaviors outlined in the above 
quote from the DSM. The surface outcome is thus one and the same. 
Manifest in speech (verbal-linguistic signs) echolalia does not seem to fit with Peirce’s 
pure icon. Despite the speaking-autistic person’s diffuse separateness and disintegrated 
self (depriving her of the two conditions motivating communication and speech) she does 
speak, mostly using conventional words and phrases. Further examination of the verbal 
phenomena listed in the DSM under echolalia, shows that it should be considered as 
being situated in between symptomatic – index, i.e., associated by contiguity, and –on the 
other hand - verbal sign which iconically images the autistic states (secondness) or is 
analogous to them (thirdness). 
Reading through hundreds of pages of Hadar’s diary, echolalia is prominent: it forms the 
macro raison d’être of writing the diary and from there on reaches down to the lexical 
micro level. As she disclosed in the diary it served as a medium for the reproduction of 
particular texts/narratives over and over again. These pages were not written with a 
reader (herself or others) in mind. Their writing served the same local and immediate 
function as any other repetition, such as rocking back and forth on the chair (see the DSM 
list cited above): soothing and reassuring through repetition. Clearly to this end the 
semiotic quality of language, namely the communicative use of the signs to convey (to 
the not-I) content via form is irrelevant.  
                                                8 Physiologically derived sounds, and thus not meant to communicate (they are not a cry  for help),  genuine  exclamation words,  are according  to  Peirce’s  categorization indexes  integrated into the lexicon as linguistic elements. “Ouch”, an authentic pain cry,  is  a  canonical  example:  rather  than  a  sign  (onomatopoeic  or  otherwise) denoting  trouble,  it  is  distress  as  such.  Being  a  sound  produced  by  opening  the mouth  wide  to  instantly  inhale  oxygen  for  the  distressed  body,  it  is  a  symptom (associated by contiguity, and not by resemblance with its object).  
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2015, 4 (1), 4-30  
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.2015.001 
 
9 
Excerpt [1] illuminates the characteristic echolalia:     
[1] kaasher hayiti Gan Olami […] asu li et ha-shkiat dam ha-dkira ba b-tor haftaa az oto 
zman Miryam ha-ozeret natna cvitat xiba b-taut baxiti shfoferet mayonez bayit im gag 
adom9 
Gloss:10 When [I] was (ps. 1p sg.) {in} Olami Kindergarten […] did (subjectless 3p pl. 
imprs., =gave me) the blood sedimentation test{.} the puncture came as [a] surprise{.} 
then same time Miryam the cleaning lady gave (omission of syntactic object: herself 
as recipient) [an] affectionate pinch by mistake{.} [I] cried (ps. 1p sg.){:} 
{“}mayonnaise 
tube{.} [a] house/home with [a] red roof{
“
.}
11                     
 
As apparent, not only were the fixed, stuck-together, idiosyncratic compounds 
“mayonnaise tube” and “[a] house/home with a red roof” unrelated to each other, they 
were also unrelated to the specific context. In stressful situations or when Hadar 
deliberately tensed herself, she produced them for the sake of repetition. As a ritualized 
verbal pattern (detached of any lexical meaning) this example of echolalia constitutes not 
only a symptom (form connected with object by cause and effect relations) but also a 
pure icon (associated by identity – lack of separation) of the autistic state.    
     
As indicated in DSM-V, echolalic ritualized verbal patterns are a subclass of other (non-
verbal) ritualized patterns. As is the case here, such verbal patterns may initially have 
been created by the autistic speaker, but by ritualizing them the option of a new 
production is blocked (see also Amir, 2014, pp. 76-90). Moreover, the autistic state of 
detachment from the experience of self makes the issue of source – whether it is the 
speaker’s own text; idiomatic literary language, or someone else’s regular (non-
pathological) speech – immaterial. Accordingly, the person with autism experiences the 
repetition of her own speech in the same way as she experiences observing her own 
photos (see [7] below). As it is an external retrieval of ready-made speech, echolalia 
contrasts with spontaneously generated speech. Such stereotyped speech is external to the 
unique situation and context. 
This brings us to echolalia not as a pure icon but as a diagram (secondness) in which the 
repetitive quality of the linguistic signifiers iconically resembles their referents 
(contents).   
                                                9  For  each  excerpt,  a  broad  transliteration  of  the  Hebrew  text  is  followed  by  an English  glossary  equivalent  of  the  idiosyncratic  content  and  form.  Inevitably,  the gloss  appears  as  ungrammatical,  incomplete  or  otherwise  deficient  odd  sentences (see  note  4  above).  For  convenience,  proper  names  are  capitalized  in  the transliteration.     10  Gloss  notations:  round  brackets  are  reserved  for  additional  grammatical information;  square  brackets  are  used  to  list  linguistic  elements  implicit  in  the Hebrew  grammar  but  explicit  in  English.  For  clarity  essential  punctuation marks, prepositions and conjunctions were added in curled brackets.  Abbreviations of grammatical information (mainly regarding inflection): first person = 1p; second person = 2p; third person = 3p; past = ps.; participle = prtc.; future = ft.; impersonal  (neuter)  =  imprs.;  singular  –  sg.;  plural  =  pl.;  masculine  =  ms.  and feminine = fm.      11 On the significance of these events, see pp. 20‐22 below. 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A phenomenon typically associated with autistic echolalia involves self designation. As 
detailed below (see pp. 10-16) not all forms and incidents of shifted pronominal deixis 
should be attributed to echolalia. Still, some incidents of the use of second person 
pronoun to designate oneself clearly originate in echolalia. Such is Hadar’s invariable use 
of an enclitic second person suffix when she tells of harmful or negative incidents 
resulting from (deliberate or uncontrolled) deeds in which she has been the agent. She 
then uses formulaic Hebrew collocations such as “ole lak al ha-acabim” (E: gets on your 
nerves, see [9] below); “biglalek” (E: owing to you) and “lo letaamek” (E: not to your 
taste) – all in the second person, as if replicating the negative comments she received (in 
response to her reprehensible deeds) but without adjusting perspectives to herself as the 
thematic object, which would require grammatical first person. 
 
Secondness 
Peirce’s secondness consists of signs in which form resembles content but is not identical 
with it. Such resemblance could be similarity between the signifier and the referent, or 
similarity between significant features of the form and qualities of the referent. 
Secondness is exemplified here by the autistic iconic use of person pronouns and markers 
(I not-I, pp. 10-16 below) and content words vs. procedural (structural) grammar markers 
(soft vs. hard relations, pp. 16-18 below). 
 
Modes of designating oneself which iconically image the autistic state 
As mentioned a key verbal behavior associated with autism is the “use of ‘you’ when 
referring to self” (see DSM-V, 2013, p. 54).  
 
Communication and the use of language in general, and the symbolic (non-echolalic, see 
above) use of the pronoun “I” – referring to self, the first person speaker in particular - 
necessitates an internal notion of self, yielding differentiation between I and not-I. In 
view of the process of intrapsychic development, it is no coincidence that in normal 
language acquisition infants master this faculty around the formative age of 30 months 
(see e.g., Bosch, 1970, p. 109; Cruttenden, 1977; Clark, 1978; Berman, 1985, pp. 273, 
303-308). First person pronoun markers are unique in that in any possible normal-natural 
context (excluding artificial situations such as an actor on stage, or when one quotes 
direct speech) it is only the individual speaker who can use first person pronouns and 
markers, and when doing so she necessarily refers to herself. In contrast with second, 
third and impersonal pronouns (such as “you” “she”, “we” or zero [Ø]) no two speakers 
can use “I” (or “me”, “mine”) to designate one and the same person. This is why the 
appropriate use of “I” cannot be grasped and learned by rote mimic. The infant does not 
hear “I” referring to itself. Apart from integrated self, separation and grammatical 
competence, the successful acquisition of first person markers requires flexibility 
supported by play and inference.   
  
Bosch (1970) points out that (what he terms) the confusion of personal pronouns in 
autistic language is consistent and regular (by no means random), springing, according to 
him, from the autistic etiology and state. Contrary to typically developing infants’ 
initially mixed use of pronouns, autistic speakers do not only persist in this behavior but 
also, as Bosch pointed out, stick to a replacement of  “you” for “I” but not the reverse 
(see e.g., Tustin, 1992, p. 54).  
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The establishment of a mature notion of self – I not-I – becomes manifest in the 
distinctive choices a person makes between the possibilities offered by the grammatical 
and pragmatic system (see Kasher and Meilijson, 1996, but see note 2 above). Hebrew, 
being a synthetic (heavily morphologically marked) language, offers rich options. 
Grammatical markers indicating pronominal forms for deixis indicating the speaker’s 
perspective emerge in the morpho-syntactic inflection of verbs (tenses); in an explicit 
pronominal form and in its subject syntactic agreement with the verb and in the object’s 
(dative possession, patient) case roles (Berman, 1985). Moreover, verbs and adjectives 
are usually marked for gender. Usually, we say, because when we face or hear the subject 
speaking of herself (first person) this grammatical information is pragmatically 
redundant, and so no grammatical marker designating the first person is marked for 
gender.  
 
This morpho-syntactic richness constantly compels the young Hebrew speaker to take a 
stand: to identify in each event and utterance the grammatical relations and qualities 
(including gender) which hold between her as a speaker and the participants and objects 
occupying the various syntactic roles. This entails intricate manifestations of self-imaging 
in the speech of Hebrew speaking persons with autism. The choice of signs – personal 
pronouns and markers - is iconic to the pragmatic locus (I-not-I) of the speaker. Being 
part of an acquired language signification system it is beyond the quality of pure icons.  
  
First person markers when referring to others – be it the addressee or a third person –  
were categorically non-existent in Hadar’s oral speech and diaries (see note 16 below), 
and so this reversal was no option in her pragmatic-grammatical inventory. The fact that 
when referring to herself she used first person markers such as “ani” (E: I); “-i” enclitic 
suffix for verb past tense inflection and object pronouns (E: “me”; ‘mine’) as one option, 
by no means reduced her use of second person, third person (including her own proper 
name, at times followed by her family name) forms, as well as the impersonal form and 
inanimate pronouns to refer to herself. In fact, in light of the standard obligatory use of 
first person markers in the appropriate pragmatic circumstances her use of first person as 
one option among a rich inventory is iconic, and so telling.    
 
[2] bikashti lhitkaleax levad b-kohot acmex 
Gloss: [I] asked (“-ti”: ps. 1p sg.) to shower alone on her own (“-ek”: 2p fm. sg., 
literally: with her own power){.} 
 
Excerpt [2] exemplifies some of the options Hadar used to refer to herself. Even though 
an explicit realization of the subject role: “ani bikashti” (E: I asked) is quite common in 
Hebrew, the obligatory realization of first person singular verb inflection (“-ti” 
“bikashti”) unequivocally determines the subject (as the speaker) making the subject’s 
explicit mention redundant, so that it is often left out. This phrasing coincides with 
standard conversational and written Hebrew. The grammatical and lexical choices made 
so far iconically match the message: an independent (separate) self wishing to shower – 
an activity conducted in privacy –unaccompanied by others, relying on her own abilities. 
But the use of the second person “acmex” (in place of the expected first person “acmi”) 
challenges the entire picture. This phenomenon attested throughout the corpus rules out 
parapraxes or a grammatical agreement error or a pragmatic shortcoming (see note 2 
above). In the specific context of [2] it seems to result from the autistic state perpetuated 
by echolalic segments (see above). 
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 [3] b-ikar ein li al ma lihyot lehuta zehu ha-goral shel Hadar v-nosaf l-ze at isha 
mevugeret bat41 kimaat zkena […] zehu ha-mazal ha-ra shel Hadar lo ba mi-ha-leida v-
gam regishut yeter […] 
Gloss: Mainly there is nothing for me to be enthusiastic (prtc. fm. sg.) about{.} that’s 
Hadar’s fate{;} and in addition you [are a] grown[-up]/adult woman aged41 almost [an] 
old [woman] […] that’s Hadar’s bad luck{.} {it did} not come  (ps. 3p ms. sg.) from the 
birth and also hypersensitivity […]  
 
Excerpt [3] illustrates three modes standing here for self reference: the standard dative 
first person article “li” (E: me); her proper (given) name “Hadar” (twice) and the object 
second person feminine pronoun “at” (E: you, fem. sing.). Customarily, speakers would 
state their proper name (given name, possibly followed by their family name) only in the 
mode of introduction. The speaker may mention her addressee’s name (but not her own) 
as the second person referent of the vocative case, i.e., for addressing that addressee or 
drawing her attention. A third person’s name is commonly used by the speaker to refer to 
that person.  
 
Unlike with the use of second person above (see pp. 8-10), the content and grammar of 
[3] clearly rule out echolalia as an explanation. This is a narrative Hadar kept telling 
herself. The use here of second person and given name (third person) iconically images 
the content of her utterance as well as her alienated state: lacking a sense of self, and thus 
feeling no control over her own fate.12  
 
A moving expression of detachment and relatedness to self is articulated, iconically using 
“recited” first person, proper name (“our Hadar”) in the following excerpt in which she 
relates to her coming death:   
 
[4] ani roca lamut kaasher yihye b-mea v-esrim b-kever shaxor axarei ha-bdika b-yom 
rishon ha-rofim lexlitu ken ishpuz b-Shaare Zedek o Hadaasah Ein Karem od nituax lhoci 
et gush yesh li xaze nituax plasti mi-ze yakol lamet yekola lamut ze az nigmar Hadar 
shelanu […] vilava shelax shaa 9 ba-boker bi-mkom ze tavo xanixa xavera xadasha shma 
gam Hadar b-gil yoter cair bat shmone esare […] 
Gloss: I want (prtc. sg. fm.) to die when be (ft. 3p ms.) in hundred twenty in [a] black 
tomb{.} after the check up on Sunday the doctors decided (3p pl. typos.) yes to 
hospitalization in Shaare Zedek or Hadassah Ein Kerem (medical centers) another 
operation to remove the lump I’ve got chest plastic surgery from this (one) can die 
(ms.) (one / I ) can die (fm.)13 from this{.} so finished (over) with our Hadar […] your 
                                                12 Hadar’s statement in [3] that she was not, so to say, born into this state, is one of many  texts  in which Hadar  grants  us  an  innocent  first‐hand  report  of  the  autistic state, which matches – and  so  supports – academic  studies and  theses  concerning autism and persons with autistic spectrum disorder (see e.g., Kanner, 1943, p. 250, see also note 23 below).       13 The psycholinguistic  (as well  as metalinguistic) notion of  “repair”  entails  I not‐I awareness,  as  if  to say:  I produced an erroneous utterance and  in order to get my message  successfully  across  to my  addressee  I must  repair  this  shortcoming  (see e.g.,  Keen,  2003).  Throughout  hundreds  of  pages  of  Hadar’s  writing,  she  never crossed out a single word. “Can die (fm.)” immediately following “(one) can die (ms.) 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funeral (typos.) 9 in the morning{.} in place of this{,} [a] new resident{,} member (or 
friend) also named Hadar in [a] younger age eighteen [years] old […]            
 
Hadar uses various modes to refer to her (dying) self: explicit first person subject position 
“I”; first person possession (I’ve got = my lump); subjectless: “Ø can die” (I can die); 
impersonal (neuter) and proper name “finished with our Hadar” (see [4a] below); second 
person (your funeral) as well as inanimate pronoun (“instead of this”: me) referring to 
herself.  
 
Excerpt [4a], drawn from a different notebook of the diary, presents the same narrative 
but offers other verbal means and context:       
 
[4a] maxar horidu et tfarim tamuti lo yihye yoter Hadar nexapes Hadar xanixa axeret 
xadasha  
Gloss: Tomorrow removed (subjectless ft. 3p pl. imprs.) stitches{.} die (subjectless ft. 
2p sg.) {,} not be (ft.) Hadar anymore{,} search (ft. 1p pl.) Hadar another new resident{.}      
 
The self-reference in [4] and [4a] which is iconic to the autistic state, is immensely 
amplified in light of the content of these excerpts. Facing (early) death and lacking the 
sense of self and of holding, a form of continuance – such as in the memory of others – is 
not perceived as an option. Her use of “our” (our Hadar) in [4] and “another” (“another 
Hadar”) in [4a] as if to narrow the semiotic/pragmatic extension of “Hadar” seems to 
render her perception of names as common nouns or adjectival tags and not as onomastic, 
persons’ proper names. This is not an impairment to do with knowledge (see Kasher and 
Meilijson 1996, and note 2 above) but a linguistic behavior iconically imaging the autistic 
objectification of persons and words (see pp. 24-27 below). In the next excerpts, Hadar’s 
use of the second person pronoun (in place of the grammatically expected first person) 
iconically depicts her mental as well as physical reality:    
 
[5] ani kol ha-zman meyallelet mekateret boxa coeket coraxat ad ha-shamayim doreshet 
dvarim ani lo yexola lkabel noshexet et acmaex ha-yadayim male siman shel xabalot 
Gloss: All time long I whine{,} grumble{,} cry{,} shriek{,} scream to high heaven{,} order 
things I can’t get{,} bite (all verbs in the prtc. fm. sg. form) herself{;} the hands full [of] 
wound’s mark{.}   
 
The grammatical formation iconically images the phenomenon of objectification: her 
body, the hands she bites, as well as the wound marks she notices (made by her own 
teeth) are experienced as objects external to herself: not “my hands” but “the hands” (see 
also Bosch, 1970, p. 94). This accords with the apparent absence of an authentic 
                                                                                                                                       (one /  I)” (in [4]) could be a single case of verbal repair. Alternatively,  it could be explained  as  an  unmarked  form  (ms.)  expressing  an  aphorism,  followed  by reference  to  herself  (fm.),  or  it  could  also  be  a  double  statement  broken  into masculine  and  feminine.  The matter  of  verbal  repair  is  of  importance  concerning autistic speakers, as it concerns speech act management (see Keen, 2003) not as raw pragmatic  and  socio‐pragmatic  competence  (see  Kasher  and  Meilijson,  1996  on repair,  and  see  note  2  above)  but  as  linguistic  behaviour  originating  from  I  not‐I distinction, absence and need. Unfortunately, these issues cannot be pursued here.           
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expression of internal pain formed using first person: she reports on observing the 
wounds but not on sensing them.  
The apparent gap between hypersensitivity (see [3] above) and the detachment in [4] is 
well attested concerning autism in general, and in Hadar’s case seems to be settled by the 
distinction between external tangible sensual stimuli (such as heat or noise) to which she 
was hyper-sensitive and internal self-inflicted physical pain to which she appeared 
indifferent (see p. 18 below, but see also pp. 20-24 below). 
 
Excerpt [6] illustrates another situation, iconically expressed by means of the second 
person possession suffix:  
[6] […] kimaat lo sholetet al acmex 
Gloss: […] almost (literally hardly) not control (prtc. fm. sg.) on (sic., see following 
[7] below) yourself{.} 
 
This could well be a case of echolalia (see [2] above), but the qualification of the verb 
‘control’ by what seems an unexpected and inappropriate quantifying adverb “kimaat”, as 
well as the content, reinforces its reading as iconically imaging the lack of control over 
the self.  
 
A broader sense of detachment emerges in reports such as the one about looking through 
her own photo album [7] and when reporting dreams [8]:  
 
[7] […] ha-albom lo shel ha-yaldut Hadar smexa kmo ciyeru oti axrei keev beten […] 
cilum al Hadar lifnei ha-shad […]  
Gloss: […] the album {-} not of childhood {-} Hadar [is] happy like drew (subjectless ps. 
3p pl.) me after [a] tummy ache […] [a] photo on (sic) Hadar before the breast […] 
 
The situation of looking through a photo album in general and one own’s in particular, 
seems to amplify the autistic state: the categorical demarcation between looking at 
oneself and looking at others is blurred, as well as, that between echoing (photo) and 
imaging (drawing), as the excerpt bears out.14 Hadar’s grammatical “error” replacing “of” 
with “on/about” (see also [6] and [15]) further distances her self from the situation, 
resulting in a story-like reporting about something (not-I).          
 
[8] […] halaxti lanuax ba-xeder taxat smixa im az xalamti eize xalom […] Hadar yocet l-
biluy la-ir beit tixo beit kafe oxelet salat […] Hadar b-gil axer lifnei ha-mashber shel 
Sima lo rak im shad axat shtei shadayim bli gushim ba-shad    
Gloss: […] [I] went (ps. 1p sg.) to rest in the room under the blanket with then [I] 
dreamt (ps. 1p sg.) a dream […] Hadar goes (prtc. fm. sn.) out [on an] outing to town{:} 
Ticho House (a restaurant in Jerusalem) {,} coffee shop { } eating (prtc. fm. sg.) salad 
[…] Hadar in a different age before the Sima crisis{,}15 not only with one breast two 
breasts without lumps in the breast{.} 
                                                14 This resembles Peirce’s example of pure iconicity “So in contemplating a painting, there  is  a  moment  when  we  lose  the  consciousness  that  it  is  not  the  thing,  the distinction  of  the  real  and  the  copy  disappears,  and  it  is  for  the  moment  a  pure dream – not any particular existence,  and yet not general. At  that moment we are contemplating an icon”. (1965, Book 3, p. 211).  15 Hadar refers here to an incident which she associates with a teacher named Sima. 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The following modes show up when Hadar refers to herself in her dream report:  the 
grammatical first person verb suffix (see [2] above); her own given name (as if 
designating a third person) and a zero alternant in place of the missing subject expected 
(obligatory) first person pronoun (“ani” E: I) of the verb “to eat”. The latter results in an 
impersonal (neuter) form (a “fourth person” as it were), i.e., no specific person.   
       
In her oral speech Hadar’s mode of designating her addressee was systematically fixed 
with no modifications.16 As mentioned, she reserved first and second person verbal 
affixes and pronouns to refer to herself and not to refer to the second person (see above 
Bosch 1970). Proper name: given name, often followed by family name or by adjectival 
tags of very specific semantic fields (e.g., “Tamar Ephratt your [referring to her] 
mother”) or the zero alternate resulting in the impersonal, were the two forms Hadar used 
for referring to second and third person (as said these, along with other standard and 
nonstandard forms, also served to refer to herself (see e.g., [8] above). Interestingly she 
scarcely used third person pronouns such as “hi” (E: she); “hu” (E: he); “hem” (E: they) 
and “hen” (E: they fem.).  
 
The autistic state is iconically reflected not only by the shift of pronouns and pronominal 
markers but also by the blurring of case roles such as agent and patient. This is illustrated 
in excerpt [9]:  
 
[9] hitnahagti ha-yom al ha-boker kmo yalda mufraat ktana craxot bexi ceaakot ad ha-
shamayim az ha-cevet ala lax al ha-acabim   
Gloss: [I] behaved (ps. 1p sg.) today since the morning like a troubled (fm. sg.) small 
(fm. sg.) girl (fm. sg.) {:} shriek{,} cry{,} scream to high heaven{,} then the staff got on 
your nerves{.}  
 
The content as well as pragmatic roles reveal role switching: her behavior got on her own 
nerves (in place of the staff’s nerves). This excerpt, concluding the matter of first person 
designation, adds a fifth mode, hitherto not encountered: leaving out herself as an 
initiator, a human agent. As opposed to zero alternate for unspecified impersonal verbal 
form, ellipsis, by omitting any trace of the doer, iconically materializes here in the 
absence of a verb. This entire utterance ([9]) consists of a flat amalgamate of nouns, in 
                                                                                                                                       Ever since her childhood, Hadar considers this event as a major crisis.  16 Hadar use to send out  letters on special occasions such as new‐year, and thank‐you letters. Letters are the typical written appeal to a second person, but it is not by accident that the style of Hadar’s letters, which in many respects resembles her oral speech  and  her  diary  style,  differs  tremendously when  it  comes  to  stylistic  letter writing  peculiarities.  These  peculiarities  are  further  reinforced  due  to  the ceremonial  nature  of  greeting  letters:  they  are  not  spontaneous,  may  even  be dictated, or phrased, by a member of staff (in the hostel or in the work place). Never in  oral  encounters  did  Hadar  express  any  interest  in  her  interlocutor.  A  letter consisting  of  formulaic  questions  such  as  “How  are  you  doing?”  stands  out  as inauthentic, both  in  its  form (second person pronoun for  the addressee) and  in  its contents. This oddity, firstly for Hadar (as the writer), showed up in one particular letter  in  which  all  modes  of  reference  (including  one  incident  of  first  person pronoun) to the addressee appeared in a mess. 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which even the cries and screams a living agent necessarily produces are objectized as 
detached entities.  
This morpho-syntactic iconic structuring serves to point out one more deficiency 
characteristically associated with the construction of interaction that constitutes the topic-
comment (theme-rheme) relations in an utterance. Being aware of the separation of I-not-
I, the speaker (I) bases the new information she wishes to communicate to the not-I on 
what she believes to be shared, known information (see Chafe, 1976). The topic of the 
sentence presents the latter, whereas a distinct predicate provides the new information 
(rheme). Mastering this division of communicative labor between theme and rheme is 
part of intersubjective, and thus discursive-pragmatic, competence.17 The absence of a 
theme in [9] deprives the addressee (not-I) of the shared information and prevents the 
differentiated designation of the doer and her deeds.             
 
Pronoun references are linguistic signs. The odd linguistic – morpho-pragmatic – choice 
of articles, i.e., mismatch between the two (independent) phases of these signs: the 
pronominal form and its content (the reference) in autistic speech iconically parallels the 
autistic state of being.  
 
As explained, unlike mutism (see p. 7 above) any use of language, in so far as it involves 
signs (resulting from the diagrammatic merging of an independent form with content) is 
not pure iconicity. Yet, the bringing together of certain independent yet non-arbitrary 
elements (modes designating self and image of self) is indeed iconic, and thus telling.     
 
Content words vs. grammar markers: soft vs. hard relations 
Being a system of signs language includes two complementary elements: content words 
and structural-procedural words. Content words are lexemes such as nouns, verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs, denoting referents in the world. These could be objects or events, 
real or imagined, internal or external, objective or subjective. Structure words, such as 
affixes and articles, prepositions, conjunctions and discourse markers, are responsible for 
structuring the relations in the particular linguistic unit (construct form, sentence or 
discourse) and so produce hierarchy and cohesion within and among units.  
Focusing now on the management of content words and procedural words in Hadar's 
texts, we notice that the line dividing between content words and procedural words 
should not be considered categorical. Instead it should be drawn between particles 
(grammar and discourse markers) governed by formal rules (particular to the specific 
language) irrespective of meaning, on the one hand, and pragmatically governed markers 
on the other.   
The former constitute the objective and rigid container or skeleton holding the subjective, 
flexible and changing (speaker and context dependent) content. Hadar's overall linguistic 
behavior complied with the grammatical rules directly associated with the skeleton: 
number, tense and gender inflections and other grammatical articles show up where 
Hebrew grammar (morphology and syntax, see also Kanner, 1943, p. 144) prescribes 
                                                
17 This too is of importance concerning the autistic speaker. Due to space constraints the  issue  of  given  vs.  new  in  light  of  the  perception  of  the  not‐I  (as  e.g.  question‐answer; definite article and proper names vs. descriptions, etc.) cannot be pursued here. 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them. But their content does not match the referents and the relations obtaining in the 
world. As we have seen, once the grammatical forms are determined (such as second 
person designating oneself) the grammatical agreement rules follow intact. The same also 
was true regarding prepositions, e.g., [6], [7] and [15], in which case a preposition was 
syntactically present (“al” E: on / about) but its odd semantic selection was the outcome 
of her odd perception of herself as a figure in a story or in a photo album.  
Conjunctions (such as “and”, “but”, “if” and “because”) are responsible for the coherence 
of the text, prepositions – half way in between grammar and pragmatics – designate 
relations. As such, they comprise the textual skeleton. Amir (2014, 75-90) cleverly 
portrays the autistic syntax as the inverse use of an organ point. A musical organ point is 
a sustained tone that interacts with the changing music to create polyphony (harmony, 
disharmony, continuation and shift).18 The autistic inverse use of a psychic organ point, 
says Amir (2014, p. 77)  
 
is […] a similar phenomenon, in which what was meant to be the framing structure 
refuses to be erased, to fade and take the status of a background […] Instead of 
affording a base for flexibility and renewal – the sustained organ point becomes a 
dominant, exclusive content.    
 
Conjunctions, linguistically categorized as structure words, constituting the (hard) 
vertebra – the linguistic skeleton – are therefore expected to be intact in the autistic 
syntax (on hard/soft see below). But this anticipation is tricky, because conjunctions are 
not determined by formal grammar but by the flexible semantic and pragmatic 
relationships which obtain in the world. Moreover, it is the very essence of conjectures to 
connect and relate (see Amir 2014, 87). Hadar's habit to leave out conjunctions iconically 
reflects the nature of the (inner) skeleton: the rigid links are there but they are disjoint, 
failing to carry a firmly integrated narrative:   
[10] tiyul shabat mata shel ha-shzifim nixnas li anaf b-tox ha-ayin halxu l-tipul    
Gloss: {on / during} Sabbath outing { } orchard of the plums {then/suddenly} [a] branch went 
into my eye { } went (subjectless ps. 3p pl.) for treatment{.}   
 
The cause and effect link missing in [4a] between “tomorrow removed stitches” and 
“[I'll] die” or the absence of a temporal conjunction in excerpt [12] below (and see [17]-
[20] below), are classified as structure words, thus belonging to the linguistic skeleton, 
but reflect the pragmatic (content) relations and states existing in the referent (outer 
                                                18  Amir’s  distinction  between  hard  (syntax)  and  soft  (semantics)  tying  up  with Tustin’s  (1992,  pp.  92‐134,  and  see  below)  explanation  of  the  autistic  dialectical experience  of  soft  v.  hard,  seems  a  clear  case  illuminating  the  loss  resulting  from Kasher  and  Meilijson  (1996)  isolating  syntax  being  intact  in  autistic  speech  and pragmatic  impaired  from  the  autistic  etiology  and  context  of  being,  and  so overlooking its iconic psychic context (see note 2 above). 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world). In line with the omission of conjunctures is the apparent absence of punctuation 
marks. Punctuation marks are orthographic notations for paralanguistic oral expressions 
such as prosody and intonation. They belong in the pragmatic discursive phase, which is 
not governed by grammar rules. The absence of punctuation marks (except for an 
automatic – ritualized – full stop at the conclusion of each narrative chunk – stating 
“zehu”. (=E: that’s it.)) reflects the autistic person’s stilted monotonous intonation (along 
with non-varied facial expressions), all iconic to the autistic state (see DSM-V, 2013, p. 
54). As discussed in pp. 24-27, there seems to be iconic similarity between the intricate 
hard and soft relations in the experience of the person with autism of self and world 
(content) and the above mentioned linguistic relations between grammatical form and 
lexical content. Strict compliance with rigid grammar rules is part of the soothing 
encompassing function of repetition: grammar rules are the ritual of language but when 
they serve as inverse organ point they expel (inner) content altogether.   
 
Autistic perception of affinity: affection and kinship 
The failed achievement of mature differentiation between I and not-I manifests itself on 
the psychic intersubjective level in severe deficits in social communication and social 
interaction and on the external sensory level in “hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input 
or unusual interest in sensory aspects of the environment” (DSM-V, 2013, p. 50). 
The autistic mode of being is often described as a glass dome or a cocoon to which the 
child or person with autism clings as a concrete wrap or shield.  
In typically developed language usage, the speaker wishing to contact and communicate 
with the other, uses the uniform rigid grammar – language skeleton – to support and 
transmit her unique, individual, flexible creative content: stories, emotions, experiences, 
thoughts and the constant flow of feeling in the self. It is fascinating to see how in 
Hadar’s autistic expressions the ostensibly plain use of content words, such as words 
denoting emotions or kinship terms, turns out, when referring to their immediate 
(linguistic) context, to be a superfluous application. This empties them from their 
internal-emotional depth, and so all that is left is reference to an external concrete 
referent. Such was the case regarding will and independence in [2]. We now look at 
longing:   
[11] kaasher mishehu nosea l-xuc la-aarec xodesh wa-xeci shana wa-xeci mi-rov 
gaaguim xazaqim mkablim harbe matanot 
Gloss: When someone goes abroad a month and-a-half a year and-a-half{,} {abundant 
with} strong longings { } (subject omission) receive (prtcp. pl. imprs.) many presents{.}   
 
“Strong longings” is a common expression denoting the emotion aroused by the absence 
of someone close and meaningful, often in the context of travel abroad. But in the 
specific context such emotionally expressive use of the word is ruled out disclosing 
instead a rigid concrete give-and-take transaction: physical absence reimbursed with gifts. 
The phrasing of this excerpt iconically presents this objectization: rigid grammatical 
articles, such as inflectional number agreement, are intact. Yet not only are prepositions 
(such as “[for] a month”); cause and effect prepositions or conjunctions (such as “a 
month and-a-half [and] a year and-a-half”) missing, like in the absence of immediate 
contact with the distant person, here too there are no people: longing is detached from its 
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intersubjective personal experience and so described in terms of objects (see Asperger, 
1944, pp. 70-78 and note 57 there). 
 
Another typical case is one in which the broader context of an emotion word affords a 
perception of inner content (emotions) in terms of external – visual appearance. Here is 
Hadar’s report on her mother’s visit, when her mother took her to a close-by supermarket 
for a treat and Hadar misbehaved:  
[12] osa carot l-ima mdaberet shtuyot gasuyot zoreket avanim ba-avir […] az ima baxta 
mi-rov kaas 
Gloss: (subjectless) makes (prtcp. fm. sg.) trouble for Mummy{:} talks (prtcp. fm. sg.) 
nonsense{,} rude (words) {,} (subjectless) throws (prtcp. fm. sg.) stones in the air […] so 
Mummy cried (ps. 3p fm. sg) out of much anger{.}19        
 
Sobbing – shedding tears – is a distinct visual manifestation of (internal) grief. Hadar 
misinterpreted this appearance as an expression of anger instead of expression of sorrow, 
because the former is a feeling directed outwards whereas sorrow is internal.   
 
Similar instances of emotional voiding of content words also show up in the resemblance 
between the autistic state and language preferences of other content words. Here we 
confine the discussion to a unique group – that of the semantic field of kinship – as it 
emerges from Hadar’s writings. What seems at first to be standard innocent use of 
kinship content words turns out to render a blurred distant affinity.  
[13] […] doda Bettie xavera shel ima mi-anglia anti Bettie ihayta haxi elegantit 
Gloss: […] Auntie Bettie [a] friend (fm.) of Mummy from England{.} Auntie (in 
English, see note 26) Bettie was (ft. 3p fm. sg.) the most elegant{.}             
 
[14] […] ha-xaverot krovei mishpaxa shel ha-axayot sheli Michal ve-Shira b[a]-kita ha-
cofim beit-sefer avdu […]  
Gloss: […] The friends (fm.) family relatives of my sisters Michal and Shira in the 
class{,} scouts{,} school worked (ps. 3p pl.) […] 
 
Hadar’s frequent use of “friend” along with the mention of kinship terms reveals 
ignorance of the variations of intimacy holding between I and not-I: the expected 
distinction between siblings and friends (both belong to peer group) is missing: her 
mother’s sister is a friend, her own sisters’ friends are their relatives but not (transitively) 
her relatives. In light of this estrangement, Hadar’s use of the third person possessive 
pronoun (“your”) when referring to her own sister, as in  
 
[15] yesh li zikronot tovim mi-ha-avar al tiyul b-shxunat Talbiya yaxad im Michal axotex  
Gloss: I have good memories from the past on (sic.)20 a walk in [the] Talbiya 
neighborhood together with Michal your sister{.} 
 
                                                19 The entire excerpt  telling of herself  is phrased  in a  style  reminiscent of  a  story mode: subjectless, verbs are inflected as participle feminine singular. 20  See discussion of “al” (E; on) following excerpt [7] above. 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seems to be entailed by plain reciting (see pp. 8-10 above) but more so by the blurring of 
soft – internal – affinity in general and sisterhood in particular. DSM-V (2013, p. 50) lists 
among the signifiers of autistic spectrum disorder “Persistent deficits in social 
communication and social interaction across multiple contexts”; “3. Deficitsin 
developing, maintaining and understanding relationships”. The kinship setting as 
encountered here is iconic to the autistic state because it does not result from lack of 
understanding and pragmatic skills (see note 2 above) but originates from psychic 
developmental breakdown in which separation and thus hierarchies of intimacy– from the 
most intimate (I) to gradually more distant circles within the not-I – were not established 
and so could not be internally experienced.       
Excerpt [16] illustrates the objectization of family relations, rendering the above ([13], 
[14], [15]) lexical use unequivocal:  
[16] harasti et […] shover galim shel aba davar nadir axat b-mino davar yakar kmo ha-
dubi shel Hedva yakar kmo axot ba-mishpaxa  
Gloss: [I] ruined (ps. 1p sg.) […] Daddy’s breakwater [a] rare thing{:} one in a kind{,} 
[a] precious thing like Hedva’s teddy-bear{,} precious like [a] sister in the family{.}  
 
To express what the shiny chrome model of a (dock’s) breakwater means to her, Hadar 
compares it to a sister in the family and to her classmate’s teddy-bear. This excerpt is 
most impressive in the way it captures the nature of autistic objects as opposed to 
transitional objects. It will shortly feature again regarding iconic analogy and in the 
synthesis (p. 26 below; see the quote from Bosch, 1970, p. 93). 
 
Thirdness: Language is analogical to the autistic state 
The iconic quality of analogy (Peirce’s thirdness) clusters phenomena in which likeness 
does not inhere in the sign itself, i.e., through direct resemblance between form and 
contents (as in pp. 10-20 above), but is obtained by intermediate parallelism between two 
signs: sign A resembles sign B by way of quality X. Metaphor is a classic instance of 
such relations.  
To illuminate the analogical relations that obtain between form (Hadar’s language) and 
content (the autistic state) we look further into the autistic tendency for concreteness and 
the route of objectization as they operate in Hadar’s world and as they manifest by 
analogy in her language.  
Ever since Hadar was small – as she repeatedly said (in complaint and with frustration) 
and as she described in her diary – she had been oversensitive to heat (sun, stoves, 
cigarettes, car exhausts). Also she would not tolerate nicknames such as hypocoristic pet 
derivations of her proper name (such as “Hadari”; “Hadarile”) or words of endearment 
such as “motek” (E: sweetie), labels such as “gveret” (E: lady), not to mention debasing 
words such as “tipsha” (E: stupid).21 She hated and dreaded them and was constantly on 
                                                21  See Freud (1913, p. 54‐55) words on taboo upon names, where he says that “As was  only  to  be  expected,  obsessional  neurotics  behave  exactly  like  savages  in relation  to  names.  Like  other  neurotics,  they  show  a  high  degree  of  ‘complexive sensitiveness’  in  regard  to  uttering  or  hearing  particular  words  and  names;  and 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guard doing all she could to avoid sensing heat or hearing such words (at times, she 
would deliberately provoke such situations as an excuse to burst out, ruin an event or 
draw attention). As Hadar portrays in the following four excerpts, words sting and 
penetrate, thus, in the same way as heat, forming a threat to the shield”.   
[17] […] ha-shemesh ba-xuc yom shel kayic xamsin meod xam 35 maalot kmo erec 
micrayim ha-sipur shel pesax yeciat micrayim ba-hagada shel pesax ose li dkira ba-yad 
soref li ba-haref kmo maxat sika xada mashke im gazim bira soda tempo ambatia xama 
rotaxat akica shel dvora dabur    
Gloss: The sun outside: [a] summery day{,} heat-wave{,} very warm 35 centigrade like 
Egypt countryside the story of Passover{,} exodus from Egypt{,} Passover legend{.} 
makes (=causes, no subject, possibly referring back to the sun) a prick in the hand{,} 
burns my back/neckline like{:} [a] needle{;} [a] sharp pin{;} carbonated beverage{;} bear{;} 
soda{;} Tempo (generic use of the trade name of an Israeli soda brand) {;} hot boiling 
bath {and} [a] sting of [a] bee {or} [a] hornet{.}22 
 
[18] lakaxti ugiot shokolad asa li ba-lashon kmo motek kaasher hayiti ktana baxiti cavtu 
oti amru li motek 
Gloss: [I] took (ps. 1p sg.) chocolate biscuits {this/they} made (=caused, ps. 3p sg.) me 
(object of main verb missing) in the tongue{. / this is} like {verb or action missing}{the word “} 
sweetie{“}{,} when [I] was (ps. 1p sg) small{. / and} [I] cried (ps. 1p sg.) {because} pinched 
me (subjectless – ps. 3p pl. imprs.) me {and/or} said (ibid.) to me{:} {“}sweetie{
“
.} 
 
[19] ani yashavti ba-salon raiti toxnit l-yeladim hayta mila ba-ot tet ani haxi sonet kmo 
eizo dkira shel maxat caakti mi-ze ad lev ha-shamayim   
Gloss: I (explicit subject) sat (ps. 1p sg.) in the lounge [I] saw (watched, ps. 1p sg.) [a] 
program for children{.} there was [a] word with the letter tet (to avoid uttering 
“forbidden” words Hadar used to refer to them by their initial letter, she here alludes to 
the word “tipsha” E: stupid) {which} I hate (prtc. fm. sg.) most{.} {this felt} like some prick 
of [a] needle{.} [I] screamed (ps. 1p sg.) from this (as a result) to high heaven{.}        
          
[20] […] ha-xom shel ha-mitbax kmo cvita ba-yad o cbitat xiba   
Gloss: The heat of the kitchen {is} like [a] pinch in the hand or [an] affection pinch{.}  
 
The four excerpts lay out the analogical shift between physical sensations (such as heat or 
a prick) and words. The analogy goes through physical penetration and the existential 
threat to the fictive frail shield. This parallelism is the outcome of the objectization of 
words, the iconic sensory perception of sounds – words – as concrete physical objects. 
But the above words reveal that an additional layer of objectization takes place, and this 
                                                                                                                                       their  attitude  towards  their  own  names  imposes  numerous,  and  often  serious, inhibitions upon them”. 22 On the apparent absence of conjunctions and punctuation marks and the  lack of coherence see pp. 16‐18 above. 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is the materialization of emotions as concrete external objects: sharp, hard and physically 
penetrating, and not as psychic-internal soft experiences, such as pain or humiliation.23  
Excerpts [1], [18] and [20] provide a connection to the succession of events that led to the 
associations emerging in the iconic-metonymic shifts. In these excerpts Hadar alludes to 
physical pinching (a child’s cheek) as a way of showing affection, probably occasionally 
accompanied by verbal expressions such as pet names. Hadar often expressed her belief 
that an early experience (aged two, see note 3 above) of shock evoked by a brutal 
injection had caused her autism.24 The affectionate pinch like the unexpected vaccination 
(see [1]) were both intrusive acts performed by adults, who instead of protecting her, let 
her down by brutally penetrating her young fragile shield. Through objectization these 
traumatic experiences were analogically extended to any sudden sense of intrusion (as 
listed in excerpt [17]).                 
The high register language, most apparent in the intensive use of idioms, strongly 
associated with the speech of Asperger individuals has puzzled researchers. The central 
characteristics of idioms, propagating their use in mundane (non-pathological) registers, 
are the fact that they are memorized, frozen collocations (not generated by the speaker) 
and carried over from past cultural heritage (which also explains their figurative 
vocabulary). Despite the object-based attraction of some persons with autism to sounds 
(see below) the salience of idioms in the speech of Asperger and other individuals with 
autism spectrum disorder has nothing to do with esthetic sensitivity or preference (such as 
hyperlexia). It is the outcome of their iconic use of ready-made segments. This explains 
why these speakers equally recite slang or even texts in foreign languages (see e.g., 
Kanner, 1943, p. 238). It is most striking that the non-pathologic sociolinguistic use of 
idioms and formulaic speech, namely, the speaker’s choice in a particular setting of cited 
segments rather than her own speech, communicates her being part of that heritage and 
setting (see e.g., Chetrit, 1995). The noteworthy citing of idioms, of other’s utterances 
and the rigid use of formulaic speech in verbal individuals with autism spectrum disorder 
communicates a break, starting from her most intimate circle, namely herself, up to 
society as a whole.  
But, specifically, regarding idioms, it is not only citing that propagates their use by verbal 
persons with autism, but it is their phraseological quality, namely the gap between their 
idiomatic figurative meaning and the joint meaning of their constituents (literal meaning).  
Hadar incorporates many idioms into her speech and writing. Idioms such as “a smile on 
the face from ear to ear” (in fact two separate idioms joined) (likewise see “grumble cry 
shriek scream to high heaven” [6], [17] below) are perceived and introduced in their 
                                                23 The similarities between this iconic objectization and the phenomenon of nominal realism, the nature of the particular words (see Segal, 1957) and the matter of taboo words, are beyond the scope of this article (see note 21 above).   24  It  could well  be  that  the  vaccination  incident  to which Hadar  alludes  ([1]) was traumatic not so much because of the nurse but due to the traumatic tearing of the mother‐child symbiosis facing her own mother letting her down as she merely stood by  leaving  her  helpless.  This  is  another  case  (see  note  12  above)  in which Hadar refers  to  her  autistic  state.  It  seems particularly  interesting,  as  it might  shed  new light on the ongoing debate concerning association between MMR vaccination and autism (see e.g., Richler et al., 2006 and see also Kanner, 1943, pp. 244‐245). 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literal meaning. The autistic speaker performs a reverse analogy, from the idiom back to 
the constituents. The reverse analogy iconically conveys, through objectization and 
concreteness, the autistic intake of the external. 
Moreover, literal – concrete – handling of idioms expressing emotions and internal states, 
e.g., “a smile from ear to ear”, is in line with Temple Grandin’s recollection regarding her 
social skills training, when her aunt labeled each facial expression appearing on photos of 
Temple with the appropriate emotion-word. Temple’s aunt used these to direct Temple, 
e.g., when the mouth spreads upwards this means that the person is happy, and if 
downwards she is sad, etc (see [12] above). 
We conclude this discussion of analogical iconicity following the objectization of words 
by pointing out that very early on (between age 5 and 9) Hadar made up about a dozen 
neologisms that served her from then on to refer to states for which one would 
conventionally use emotion words. Hadar generated these neologisms25 using two 
strategies: one was by distorting English words26 as in “idevel” to denote terrifying 
incidences, originating no doubt from the word “devil”; “pik” to denote the sense of sharp 
and stunning penetration, coming from “prick”, and “rodingdang” after “rod” (smooth 
and shiny) denoting something (not necessarily tangible) to be enthusiastic about.27 The 
second group of neologisms bore no etymological relation to either existing English or 
Hebrew words; they were made up from scratch on the basis of secondary phonetic 
iconicity: back – grave – vowels (“o” and “u”) for the expression of negative horrific 
feelings (e.g., “iguzi”28 for a dancing shade reflected at night from a distant lampshade) 
and front high vowels (mainly “i”) for positive ones (e.g., “chipichipi” her sister’s sore 
toe which amused her). Such expressive sound symbolism accords with linguistic 
literature (for overview see Jakobson and Waugh, 1987, pp. 181-198) but seems counter-
intuitive to typical autistic clinging – as Amir’s (2014; and see above) inverse organ-point 
- to the hard i.e., consonants (and not soft - i.e., vowels). “Rodingdang” explained above 
could serve to settle this seeming discrepancy. To derive this neologism Hadar added 
repetitive stop (plosive) consonants to the (given) base “rod” alternating vowels: “i” and 
“a”. The resulting sound pattern accords with Hebrew (Semitic root and pattern 
formation) function of the vowels (rather than consonants) as the organ-point carrying the 
semantic variation of meaning. From a psychological perspective, the word “rodingdang” 
starting with the iconic “o” vowel (expressing graveness), moving on to “i” (signaling 
cheerfulness) may reflect the uncanny autistic state by analogical iconicity: as mentioned 
Hadar was hypersensitive to heat, and her idiosyncratic autistic objects (hard and shiny) 
were themselves sources of heat: car exhausts, toast racks, candlesticks, or taps which 
being made from metal attracted – and so released – heat. The sound symbolism and the 
intricate relations between the hard stops (consonants) and the soft vowels in 
                                                25  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  term  “neologism”  originated  in  the  context  of abnormalcy.  Webster’s  dictionary  states:  “a  usually  compound  word  coined  by  a psychotic and meaningless to the hearer” (Gove, 1986, p. 1516) and see Freud, 1900 p. 296 fn. 2.    26 Hadar was raised bi‐lingually  in Hebrew and  in English. Living  in  Israel Hebrew was her dominant language out of home. Yet, she often mixed these languages both orally and in writing.    27  See  excerpt  [16]  and  the  discussion  on  pp.  24‐27  below  concerning  autistic objects.     28 The recurrent final “i” acts as the Hebrew adjectival suffix.    
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“rodingdang” iconically reflect the uncanny attraction and dread (Freud’s “Scheu”) such 
objects entailed. 29  
The seeming antinomy between the creative faculties manifested in neologisms and the 
manifest renewal in general and imaginary play in particular, said to be blocked for 
persons with autism, is settled if we bring to mind that typically developing young 
children make up words out of ignorance (being unfamiliar with the conventional 
lexicon). As the children get familiar with the conventional – adult – words they give up 
these private words. Older autistic persons seem to be stack freezing the first stage: they 
go on using these childish neologisms, not replacing them – as anticipated – by the 
common words on the one hand and not generating more neologisms on the other. Their 
continued use of their infant neologisms is rudimental of what Tustin (1992, p. 188) 
describes, regarding autistic objects, as “the result of primary creativity having gone 
wrong”.   
A discussion of sound symbolism concludes our overview of analogic iconicity along 
with an overview, findings and analysis of the different types and examples of linguistic 
iconicity in the data.  
 
A synthesis of autistic iconic speech and the autistic 
etiology 
We devoted the previous section (pp. 7-24) to the analysis of typical autistic language 
behaviors, from muteness as pure icon, through echolalia, to grammatical and semantic 
characteristics demonstrating similarity (secondness) and analogy (thirdness) to autistic 
states.  
 
Unsurprisingly the DSM outlines diagnosis and assessment criteria for mental disorders, 
but looks into etiology issues (such as genetic or circumstantial information) only to the 
extent this is required to either support or rule out diagnosis. This is true for the DSM in 
general and in the case of ASD in particular (see note 2 above). The DSM-V’s 
denominators helped us detect manifestations of linguistic signifiers in Hadar’s writings 
and analyze them locally; it helped us identify the nature of their iconicity and explain 
them as such.    
      
Having identified these iconic pathologies from a linguistic-iconic perspective, a step 
forward is now taken by integrating the findings into a comprehensive picture in light of 
the autistic etiology.  
 
                                                29 Occelli et al. (2013) found that people with autistic spectrum disorder performed just  above  chance  in  the  classic  Maluma‐Tacket  test  (a  test  matching  two‐dimensional  visual  images  with  nonsense  words).  Bearing  in  mind  autistic prevalence  of  visual  perception,  this  seems  surprising.  It  could  well  result  from clinging to a single sound as inverse organ‐point (see Amir, 2014), and ignoring its effect  in  interaction with complementary sounds (such as stop vs.  liquids; hard vs. soft), or to methodological shortcomings when administrating artificially structured experiments  to  people with  ASD  (this  critic  also  concerns  Kasher  and Meilijson’s (1996) paper and their reliance on empirical studies in particular). 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In regard to speaking individuals with ASD DSM-V (2013, p. 53) states that “[e]ven 
when formal language skills (e.g., vocabulary, grammar) are intact, the use of language 
for reciprocal social communication is impaired”. Scholars raise serious doubts 
concerning the likelihood that autistic speech can truly be intact. Pragmatic and 
conceptual intactness should be considered an additional phase between the two types of 
intactness outlined in the quoted reservation from the DSM: language skills and the 
communicative-social use of language. Mismatches, such as the cases outlined above (pp. 
7-24) (co-reference between the personal pronoun and the denoted referent) or the 
conceptualization following (internal) discrimination between “friend” and “relative” 
come neither under language skills nor under communicative-social use of language. 
They stem from the autistic state of being interfering with the pragmatic and conceptual 
phase of language. The issue at hand is not the lack of linguistic competence or cognitive 
deficits blocking understanding. Labeling such behavior as odd is justified when 
compared not with regular speech but with typically developed differentiation between I-
not-I and more so with non-pathologic psychic development. As stated at the start, 
attempting to understand (prior to intervention and healing) autistic linguistic behavior 
from a semiotic-iconic perspective, mutism appears the pure iconic mode of the autistic 
experience (see also Kanner, 1943, p. 244; Amir, 2014, p. 79). For the person with 
autism, blocked from early normal psychological development by an abnormal fusion 
with the mother and lacking a background presence of primary identification (see Tustin 
1992, p. 33), language and interaction are not authentic to her inner psychic state. As the 
person with autism fails to proceed30 to mature, healthy separation and intimacy (I not-I) 
any engagement in language is altogether odd. 
 
This is why the authentic language of speakers with autism (those who do speak) is – 
following Amir’s words (2014, referring to various psychic languages) – “an attack on 
language”, embodying an ever-suspended state of being cut-off from pathological 
symbiosis without maturely arriving at individuation. Such language is thus omnipotent. 
Lacking dyadic object relations, it cannot connect. This results in a language detached 
from self (I’s inner world); the language of a speaker who is not motivated by the 
experience of absence (I not-I separation, see the quote from Amir, 2014, p. 1, on p. 7 
above), and so a language that does not communicate (the I to the not-I).    
 
To delve into the autistic authenticity of the non-authentic – odd – use of language (and 
language behavior) we look at excerpt [21] (Illustration 1):   
 
[21] […] baxiti lama yacaati adam lama noladti adam raciti lihyot buba o kelev caacua o 
sil o misxak yeladim o davar asu oto b-beit-xaroshet mi-xomer […]   
Gloss: [I] cried (ps. 1p sg.){:} {“}why did [I] come out (=emerge, ps. 1p sg.) a human-
being{?} why was [I] born (ps. 1p sg.) [a] human-being{?}{“.} [I] wanted (ps. 1p sg.) to 
be [a] doll or [a] toy dog or [a] seal (in English, = seal toy) or children’s game or a 
thing {that} it was made (subjectless ps. 3p pl. impers.) in a factory out of material […]   
 
Things – artifacts – are static: they 
lack the capacity to feel, interact 
(with an inner self as well as with 
                                                
30  That  is  only  individuals  clinically  diagnosed  with  ASD  and  not  individuals diagnosed for other impairments (e.g. physical, organic, mental).      
Illustration  1 
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the not-I) and accordingly, they do not adjust and grow. As shown, the language –form 
and content – of persons with autism authentically iconizes their state as objects rather 
than living persons. Examining the list detailed in excerpt [21] further reveals this 
iconicity: dolls and toys are artificially manufactured things, but like the autistic 
experience (and language) they mimic, and thus they belong in the realm of the animate-
inanimate. This brings us back to the autistic objects discussed following excerpt [16]. 
Scholars and caretakers have noticed the early preference of toddlers and children with 
autism for hard inanimate objects over Winnicott’s “transitional objects”. Tustin (1992, 
pp. 111-126) describes “autistic objects” as sensation-dominated objects particular to 
each individual child, who uses them obsessively in idiosyncratic ways, which also differ 
from the function for which they were manufactured and intended. Due to the rigid 
sensory and static quality of autistic objects play and fantasy are blocked and so they 
impair mental development. Tustin continues, “the main purpose of autistic objects is to 
shut out menaces which threaten bodily attack” (p. 115, see also Kanner, 1943, pp. 246-
250; Amir, 2014, pp. 67-90). Hardness, when detached and emptied from softness, (a 
denominator of autistic objects) constitutes an illusive pseudo-protection. This yields 
omnipotence that stops the child from seeking contact with people. This description of 
autistic objects highlights how they are the reverse of transitional objects: the latter serve 
as a bridge to reality whereas the pathological use of the former acts like a barrier to it. 
Moreover, being inanimate inflexible objects they tend to break irreparably, an 
experience that blocks the child’s prospect of growth and recovery. This dead-end, 
according to Tustin, is the source of the psychotic child’s despair (p. 121, see also the 
quote from Tustin, p. 24 above, and see also Amir, 2014, pp. 70-72).  
 
Bosch (1970, p. 93) points out that “autistic children are disturbed in their relationship 
with other people but not with things, and that this relationship with things has been 
transferred to people” (but see p. 105). In light of excerpts [16] and [21] it seems that this 
relationship with things is not merely transferred to people in general, but first and 
foremost to the autistic (impaired) self. As claimed above regarding autistic language, 
which is never completely free of oddities, this psychic-constitutional endowment affects 
and so disturbs all perceptions and relations. Being cut off from the animate-inanimate 
distinction not only objectizes and concretizes everything (self, other people as well as 
language) but as Bosch (1970, p. 106) claims, this in turn distorts her relation with things, 
as the hard complementing the soft. Tustin (1992, pp. 92-134) points out the formative 
developmental role of tolerating the fact that both soft and hard are “me” experiences, 
which enables coming to terms with the conflicting pleasure principle and reality 
principle, thus getting primary differentiation and integration going.      
 
Hadar used language to express her resentment of being born human rather than 
inanimate: a substance artificially manufactured [21]. This is not a matter of preference 
but an authentic reflection of the autistic etiology manifested in objectization. On several 
pages, where Hadar spells out the differences between the course of her life and that of 
her two twin sisters, she mentions that she did not – and will not – get married. She then 
narrates her vision of a normal life: she would have a husband, children and a 
house/home with taps, a toast rack and shiny candlesticks. This as [16] illuminates is an 
identification of soft inner relations, which in the case of Hadar is typically experienced 
by and among people with hard concrete objects. Moreover, Hadar’s inventory of home 
life poignantly demonstrates the distorted identification of possessing things (hard 
artifacts) with intimacy (soft compassionate coupling, family bond and home 
partnership).         
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Dana Amir (2014) identifies concrete language and pseudo language as two fundamental 
non-languages that negate language, as an attack on linkage (communication). For lack of 
space, we must abridge Amir’s elaborate and most relevant account. Amir characterizes 
concrete language as a functional, yet emotionally meaningless language, resulting from a 
hollow mother-infant unit, lacking “a substratum upon which a child can establish a 
private language or an experience of an ‘I’”. Pseudo language, says Amir, emerges from 
“a mother-tongue [that] was unable to give any object a stable and unambiguous status”, 
and so its function is to “[empty] language of its ability to illuminate distinctness. 
Blurring the limit between self and other is in the service of both the refusal to see the 
other as well as the refusal to see oneself” (2014, pp. 6-9). Regarding both pseudo 
language and concrete language, Amir (2014, p. 3) maintains, “the lack of emotional 
authentic language is the enactment of an unbearable primary bond” (see also Asperger 
1944, p. 70). The autistic linguistic behavior outlined here on the basis of Hadar’s 
writings emerges as a non-language characteristically merging pseudo language and 
concrete language, thus mirroring how hypersensitivity and detachment dwell together in 
the autistic state. Mutism is the most authentic – and iconic – mode enacting the 
traumatic autistic rupture of the delusory symbiotic state and what Tustin (1992, p. 12) 
describes as a state not fully born. In this premature frail encapsulation the counter-iconic 
use of language is in itself a pseudo use: “a language one can use to speak – but not to 
converse with” (Amir, 2014, p. 10). Detached from soft inner meaning and dealt with by 
means of objectization, the content materializes as concrete language.   
It must be noted that it is not the wording that counts, but the idiosyncratic context and 
circumstances in which the specific utterance appears. The very same word or phrase 
may either reflect concreteness or manifest pseudolangauge; at times it is an appearance 
of reluctant communication while at other times it may underwrite rigid compulsive 
behavior that comes to struggle against the feelings of void associated with traumatic 
separation, or serves to act as an assuring holding envelope. In yet other cases, like the 
idiom and formulaic speech, pseudo-language assumes the language of the other where 
inner speech is expected, simultaneously reflecting rigidness and objectization. Hadar did 
not use first person pronouns or articles when referring to others; except for formulaic, 
hence ritualized, letter writing patterns, she reserved second person pronouns and articles 
to herself, and as detailed, she used third person and proper name for all (self and others). 
Through restricting first and second person to herself, the concrete, emotionally hollow 
languages produces the I while the pseudo-speaker utters the second person.      
  
Conclusion 
The oddities of autistic speech (grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, stylistic odd forms or 
mismatches) genuinely reflect the unnatural foundations of the interaction of the person 
with autism in general and her verbal communication in particular. Tustin (1992, p. 118), 
explaining the effect of the use of the pathological autistic object, in place of soft 
transitional objects, says that “such a child expects to do everything at the first attempt 
without any practice away from the actual situation”. Language, as a mature substitute for 
bridging separation (I-not-I), finds the person with autism unprepared and displaced: she 
lacks the required conditions like for instance having passed through the developmental 
psychic stages and experiences that lead to separation and integration. The unsuccessful 
separation impairs the ability to confront loss, which in turn impairs motivation in general 
and interaction with the other in particular. This sequence of failures results in detached 
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non-communicative verbalization, in mimicking (a pseudo, not-I language), and in 
clinging to a hard, fixed, inanimate, concrete language devoid of soft inner contents. The 
particular speech of the autistic speaker authentically iconizes her inauthentic inanimate 
stance.  
 
We are fortunate to have Hadar’s diary and letters, and refer to Asperger’s (1944, p. 67) 
observation that the autistic personality, despite many individual differences, is highly 
distinctive, in the hope that Hadar’s unique legacy and the semiotic notion of iconicity 
have joined here to yield a productive fresh view of the order, or the authenticity, of the 
autistic verbal disorders.  
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